“Ойлигархи” плачут навзрыд в поисках правды. Их правды.

Но, номер, похоже не прошёл.

Cовладельцы «Альфа-групп» Авен и Фридман подали в суд округа Колумбия (Вашингтон, США) иск к американской организации «Center for Public Inegrity» с требованием опровергнуть ее публикацию с негативными оценками личности себя любимых. За что им ввели санкции и пункции куда следует. Суд, будучи не басманным, отклонил их иск и подтвердил правдивость изложенных в публикации фактов.

Кому интересно, я перевел машиной и чуть-чуть поправил перевод меморандума американского суда.

ОКРУЖНОЙ СУД СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ
ПО ОКРУГУ КОЛУМБИЯ
ОАО “АЛЬФА БАНК” и др,
Истцы,
Гражданский иск № 00-2208 (JDB)
ЦЕНТР ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЙ ЭТИКИ (далее ЦОЭ) – The Center for Public Integrity
и др,
ответчики.
МЕМОРАНДУМ

Истцами являются два российских бизнесмена и их компании, которые подали иск против
ответчиков, общественной организации и ее представителей, за клевету в связи с публикацией статьи, в которой утверждается, что истцы имеют связи с организованной преступностью.
статью, в которой утверждается и занимаются торговлей наркотиками.
торговлей наркотиками.

ИСТОРИЯ

I. Возвышение олигархов

Данное дело ведет свою родословную от бурных дней распада бывшего Советского Союза.
Союза. Когда Борис Ельцин пришел к власти в 1991 году, в России отсутствовали многие институты рыночной экономики и она отчаянно нуждалась в капитале.

Соединенные Штаты и международные финансовые институты, такие как Международный валютный фонд, были готовы предоставить России финансовую помощь, но только при строгом условии, что страна согласится осуществить ряд быстрых рыночных реформ. Ельцин обратился к группе молодых экономистов и ученых, чтобы осуществить необходимые изменения в российской экономике. Эти реформаторы разработали ряд радикальных мер, направленных на приватизацию и либерализацию российской экономики быстрыми темпами. По мере того как приватизационная кампания вступала в силу, становилось очевидным, что переход российской экономики был саботирован коррупцией и сговорами. Группа лиц, имевших тесные политические связи с правительством Ельцина, накопила огромные богатства и власть благодаря оптовой передаче ценных государственных активов и теневых сделок с государственными чиновниками. Эти магнаты, известные как “олигархи”, поднялись к власти в значительной степени благодаря своей способности ориентироваться и манипулировать правилами коррумпированной и беззаконной постсоветской российской экономики. Правительство не проявляло особого желания обеспечивать соблюдение законности, и организованные преступные синдикаты поспешили заполнить эту пустоту, заняв видное место. В то время как олигархи приумножали свое богатство посредством закулисных сделок, страна была ввергнута в период повальной нищеты. См. напр.

Заявление Селесты Филлипс, вып. 407, стр. 3, 15 (отчет Центра стратегических и международных исследований за 1997 год) (“Основными факторами, влияющими на ситуацию в России, являются нарушения закона”). Международный отчет) (“Главные бенефициары аукционной приватизации – были [организованные преступные] синдикаты . . . .. Результаты были подтасованны в пользу заранее выбранных лиц или банков. Россия находится под угрозой превращения в криминально-синдикалистское государство – тройку из бандитов, коррумпированных правительственных чиновников и бизнесменов, которые накапливают огромные состояния, используя коррупцию и уязвимые места, присущие обществу переходного периода”).

См. заявление Филлипса, экз. 409 на 1 (отчет Американского института предпринимательства за осень 1999 года) (“[Т]. “Реформа” привела к нищете, алкоголизму и катастрофе здравоохранения. Россия сегодня – это горстка вороватых “олигархов”, пирующих на фоне всеобщего голода”); Sullivan Decl., Ex. 258 at 1 (David Satter показания перед Комитетом по международным отношениям Палаты представителей США на слушаниях, 7 октября 1999 года)
(“[I]за несколько месяцев 99 процентов сбережений российского населения исчезли. Люди,
которые отложили деньги на покупку машины или квартиры, на свадьбу или похороны, остались
ни с чем”).

См., например, Филлипс Экз. 407 на 6 (1997 г. Центр стратегических и международных исследований
отчет) (“Западные разведывательные службы считают, что ракеты малой и средней дальности контрабандой доставлялись заказчикам на Ближнем Востоке… [а организованные преступные] группировки также способствуют переправке наркотиков по новым транзитным маршрутам из основных районов производства героина в Азии”).
Phillips Ex. 133 (статья в Financial Post от 30 мая 1998 года).

Возвышение олигархов и ухудшение состояния российской экономики стало предметом
интенсивного обсуждения в Соединенных Штатах и во всем мире. Разработчики политики обсуждали причины и возможные способы лечения различных проблем, охвативших Россию. Западные разведывательные службы все больше беспокоились о том, что страна становится прибежищем для отмывания денег, торговли оружием и т.д. Директор Федерального бюро
расследований в своих показаниях перед Конгрессом подсчитал, что русская мафия взяла под контроль более 70% всех российских коммерческих предприятий и что большинство из 2000 банков в России контролируются организованной преступностью.

Истцы Михаил Фридман и Петр Авен были двумя ключевыми фигурами в экономической
трансформации России. Фридман является основателем и председателем совета директоров “Альфа-Групп”, а Фридман участвовал в приватизации российской экономики с самого начала, когда “Альфа-банк” выиграл первый аукцион по продаже государственной собственности.
первый аукцион по продаже государственной компании, приобретя кондитерскую фабрику “Большевик”.

Сразу же после переизбрания Ельцина в 1996 году российское правительство выставило Тюменскую нефтяную компанию на аукцион. Альфа-Групп” получила 40% акций “Тюмени” за бесценок, предположительно опираясь на союзников компании в высших эшелонах российского правительства. Частные инвесторы потеряли миллиарды на девальвации рубля, появились сообщения о том, что еще миллиарды иностранной помощи были переведены на частные счета за рубежом, и многие призывали к переоценке политики Соединенных Штатов и Международного валютного фонда в отношении страны. Превращение России в “криминально-синдикалистское государство” и надлежащий ответ Запада был в центре политических дискуссий в Белом доме, 5
залах Конгресса, аналитических центрах и в прессе.

Несколько лет спустя Фридман получил оставшуюся часть Тюмени на другом аукционе. Фридман
использовал свои тюменские активы в ряде сделок, которые увеличили его состояние и власть.
Теперь “Альфа-Групп” владеет значительными долями в нефтяном и банковском секторах, а также крупнейшей в России телевизионной сетью и рядом супермаркетов. Авен Банк является крупнейшим частным банком в России. По данным журнала Forbes, Фридман является третьим самым богатым человеком в России и входит в сотню богатейших людей мира.

Авен был одним из немногих элитных менеджеров – учёных, выбранных Ельциным для того, чтобы направить страну по курсу на приватизацию. Ельцин назначил Авена своим первым министром внешнеэкономической деятельности. Авену было поручено, в частности, решить
значительную проблему внешнего долга России, и он использовал свою должность, чтобы высказываться по экономическим вопросам и программе реформ администрации. Российская и международная пресса внимательно следила за его словами и действиями. После своего ухода с поста министра в декабре 13 декабря 1992 года Авен стал президентом “Альфа-банка”, эту должность он занимает и сегодня. Ему принадлежит 15% акций Альфа-банка, Тюмени и двух телекоммуникационных компаний. Он пишет статьи и выступает перед международными организациями по вопросам экономических реформ в России.

Фридман и Авен признаны двумя самыми влиятельными российскими олигархами. Они
поддерживали тесные отношения с высшими кругами российского правительства и
установили ряд дружеских отношений и союзов с российскими знаменитостями и политиками.

По словам Фридмана, они были “игроками в олигархические игры”, накапливая богатство и влияние с беспрецедентной скоростью. В критические моменты истории России они выходили вперед, чтобы направлять ход событий в стране. Когда осенью 1993 года Ельцин столкнулся с попыткой государственного переворота, Фридман и другие олигархи были вызваны в Кремль. Несколько лет спустя, когда 17 приватизация была глубоко непопулярна, а Ельцин рисковал проиграть перевыборы коммунисту Зюганову, Фридман, Авен и остальные олигархи объединились, чтобы спасти перевыборную кампанию Ельцина, назначив нового руководителя кампании и (как утверждается) поддержав его переизбрание деньгами и поддержкой в СМИ, принадлежащих олигархам. Два года спустя Ельцин привлек олигархов в качестве своего рода экономического консультантов, а во время обвала рынка несколько месяцев спустя, олигархи поддержали правительство и успокоили обеспокоенную общественность.

Короче говоря, Авен и Фридман вознеслись на невиданный уровень известности и оказывали огромное влияние на экономические и политические дела своей страны. Российские газеты придумали название для ведущих олигархов (среди которых были Авен и Фридман) и той власти, которой они обладали: “семибанкирщина”, или “правление семи банкиров”. Financial Times в 1996 году назвала Авена и Фридмана в числе “группы из семи бизнесменов и банкиров, которая, по словам одного из них, сейчас управляет Россией”. По выражению “Moscow Times”: “Когда советские лидеры попадали в беду, они обращались за помощью к Политбюро. Когда президент Борис Ельцин оказался в тяжелом положении, он обращается к своей собственной, обновленной версии Политбюро – к группе банкиров и бизнесменов, которые, по общему мнению, управляют современной Россией”. Заявление Салливана, вып. 135 (3 июня 1998 г.
статья в “Moscow Times”).

Авен и Фридман имели широкий доступ к средствам массовой информации и другим каналам
коммуникациям. Они давали многочисленные интервью российской и международной прессе, публиковали статьи в ведущих российских газетах и выступали перед международной аудиторией.
на темы реформ, коррупции и российской экономики. Их медийное присутствие распространяется и на Соединенные Штаты. Авен и Фридман выступали перед многочисленными влиятельными организациями в США (таких как Институт Кинана и Фонд Карнеги за международный мир), а Авен выступал в многочисленных влиятельных организациях в США и давал интервью американским телевизионным новостным агентствам, включая каналы ABC и CNN.

Альфа-Групп” также потратила миллионы на разработку стратегии связей с общественностью, которая включает в себя внутренние отделы прессы, внешнее агентство по связям с общественностью, множество пресс-релизов и англоязычный веб-сайт, на котором истцы размещают свои статьи и их благоприятное освещение в прессе. В результате своего видного положения и своей медиа-стратегии истцы являются объектом широкого освещения в средствах массовой информации. В октябре 2003 года в результате поиска в онлайновой базе данных новостей поиск англоязычных статей в октябре 2003 года выявил более 1100 англоязычных статей с 1990 года, в которых упоминается имя Михаила Фридмана, и более 1400 статей, в которых фигурирует имя Петра Авена. Аналогичным образом, Альфа-Банк был темой 7 900 англоязычных статей, доступных в Интернете за этот период, а Альфа-Эко упоминается в более чем 1 200 таких статьях.

Несмотря на то, что Альфа-Банк завоевал репутацию в международном сообществе как один из самых наиболее уважаемых российских финансовых институтов, Авен и Фридман преследуются по 25 пунктам обвинений в коррупции и незаконном поведении. Российские газеты неоднократно публиковали утверждения о том, что Авен и Фридман подтасовывали результаты аукционов по продаже государственных активов через правительственные связи, угрожали жизни правительственных чиновников, заказали убийство мафиози и занимались торговлей наркотиками и отмыванием денег. По свидетельству одного из руководителей “Альфы”, “Мы все знаем подробности, потому что они печатались снова и снова, это те же самые встречи с теми же представителями картеля… преступность, наркотики, отмывание денег, все такое”. Истцы отрицают эти утверждения, и ни одно из них не было не было преследовано в судебном порядке, не говоря уже о том, чтобы доказать их истинность. Даже Фридман признал, однако, что “правила ведения бизнеса” в России “сильно отличаются от западных стандартов. . . . Сказать, что можно быть
полностью чистым и прозрачным – нереально “.

II. Статья Центра общественной этики (The Center for Public Integrity)

Ответчик ЦОЭ – это непартийная и некоммерческая наблюдательная группа, основанная бывшим продюсером программы “60 минут” Чарльзом Льюисом. Льюис создал ЦОЭ, чтобы служить источником расследований и аналитических отчетов по темам, связанным с правительственной этикой и подотчетностью государственных служащих. Одной из нескольких публикаций, которыми занимается Центр является “The Public I”, интернет-репортаж, который организация начала выпускать в 1999 году. Публикация в Интернете позволила ЦОЭ увеличить охват “точечных новостей”, или экстренных новостей, о которых необходимо сообщить быстро и в сжатые сроки.

A. Происхождение статьи

За несколько дней до Республиканской национальной конвенции 2000 года в июле 2000 года, Джордж Буш объявил, что он выберет Ричарда Б. Чейни в качестве своего кандидата в вице-президенты. Когда новость разлетелась, Льюис поручил двум репортерам и двум исследователям осветить это объявление в качестве репортажа в программе “Общественное мнение”. У ИВК был значительный опыт в отслеживании денег и влияния в политике, поэтому Льюис предложил, чтобы материал был сосредоточен на том, как пребывание Чейни на посту генерального директора компании Halliburton повлияло на отношения между компанией и федеральным правительством.
Льюис объяснил, что им нужно было “наброситься” на эту статью, и что время было “крайне важно”, потому что до съезда республиканцев оставалось несколько дней. Двумя репортерами
назначенные для освещения этой истории, были Кнут Ройс и Натаниэль Хеллер. Ройс был удостоенным наград и является репортером с более чем тридцатилетним опытом работы,
участвовавшим в подготовке трех материалов, получивших Пулитцеровскую премию. Он много писал о международной коррупции и обладал рядом контактов в сфере национальной безопасности и разведки.
Одной из статей, найденных Ройсом, был отчет “Вашингтон Пост” от января 2000 года, написанный Дэвидом Игнатиусом под названием “Странное дело России, большой нефти и ЦРУ”.
В докладе описывалось, как банк Ex-Im некоторое время был близок к принятию решения о предоставлении гарантии на 500 млн. долл. Тюменской нефтяной компании. Хотя банк был готов заключить, что кредит соответствует требованиям банка по кредитоспособности, банк столкнулся с необычной кампанией по отказу в выдаче кредита, возглавляемой компанией BP Amoco, которая боролась с Тюменской нефтяной компанией за контроль над активами обремененной долгами
нефтяной компании Sidanco в России. В статье описывалось, как BP Amoco считала, что Тюмень
использовала “неправильную тактику”, чтобы приобрести одно из прибыльных нефтяных месторождений Sidanco на закрытом аукционе по банкротству, без публичных торгов и по сильно сниженной цене.

Согласно статье, “необычной” лоббистскую кампанию сделало то, что она была
сопровождалась “сильным давлением” со стороны администрации Клинтона – уязвленной “критикой того, что она не сделала достаточно для борьбы с российской коррупцией”, чтобы “отклонить или отложить кредит”. По мере того, как банк приближался к принятию решения по кредиту, в статье говорилось, что Совет национальной безопасности попросил Центральное разведывательное управление изучить Тюмень и предоставить информацию о компании.
и предоставить информацию о компании директорам банка Ex-Im. ЦРУ предоставило “несколько аналитических отчетов и некоторые необработанные разведданные”, включая 29-страничный отчет о расследовании по Тюмени с грифом “Секретно”.
В статье приводились слова представителя ЦРУ о том, что в сопроводительном письме ЦРУ, прилагавшемся к отчету, объяснялось, что он был подготовлен “по заказу”.
объясняло, что отчет был “заказан международной нефтяной компанией и подготовлен
российской охранной фирмой, в которой работают бывшие сотрудники российской службы безопасности”. Id.
ЦРУ не сообщило, кто заказал отчет, но в статье сообщалось, что “информированный источник за пределами США
“информированный источник за пределами правительства США” сказал, что это была компания BP Amoco. Id.
В статье Washington Post сообщалось, что две с половиной страницы отчета ЦРУ были названы
помечены как “криминальная ситуация” и включают “несколько подробных обвинений в адрес тюменского
руководстве”. Id. Статья не описывала содержание этого раздела документа, но она
цитировала другого анонимного высокопоставленного сотрудника разведки, который заявил, что аналитики ЦРУ позже предоставили
на брифинге, на котором “мы изложили им свою точку зрения на тюменский отчет”.
а именно, что “он совпадает с другой информацией, собранной агентством”. Id. Статья завершилась
обсуждением результатов лоббистской кампании BP Amoco против Тюмени, указывая на то.
что, хотя банк стоял на своем, Госдепартамент приказал приостановить выдачу кредита на основании
и на следующий день Тюмень заключила соглашение с BP Amoco. Id.
at 2-3.
Ройс ознакомился и с другими статьями. Одной из них было резюме в “Banking and
Exchange Weekly” статьи в российской газете “Версия” за июль 1999 года, которая включала в себя
описание нескольких уголовных обвинений против сотрудников Альфа-Групп/Тюмень. В резюме
упоминалось, что Авен встретился с представителем колумбийского наркокартеля в Вене в 1993 году, и тогда они обсудили соглашение о выводе средств из страны.
тогда они обсуждали соглашение о переводе капитала из офшоров в Альфа-банк, что
Фридман приложил руку к организации “наркотрафика из Юго-Восточной Азии в Европу через Россию”.
и что Фридман поддерживал “многочисленные контракты” с “самым агрессивным” преступным синдикатом
в Москве. Royce Dep. at 91:4-91:12, Ex. 46 (сокращенная статья “Версии”).
15
В другой статье из российской газеты, которую нашел Ройс, сообщалось, что Виктор Илюхин,
Председатель Комитета по безопасности Российской Думы Виктор Илюхин в 1997 году обратился в Министерство внутренних дел с просьбой проверить утверждения о том, что компания “АЛЛАЙН” была арестована.
МВД проверить утверждения о том, что должностные лица “Альфа-Групп” “использовали криминальные группировки для устранения
конкурентов” и были замешаны в “получении взяток” и “хищениях”. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 30.
Вторая статья в “Версии” рассказывала о связях между “Альфа-Групп” и “самой влиятельной организованной преступной группировкой в московском криминале”.
организованной преступной группировкой в криминальном мире Москвы”, и говорится, что последняя имеет “влияние” на
Альфа-банком, гарантирует защиту Фридмана и Авена и поддерживает определенные
“операции”. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 51 (электронное письмо Ройсу, содержащее перевод статьи “Версии”).

уклонение от уплаты налогов, [и] коррупция”, что у него “мало сомнений в том.
сомневается, что [Альфа-Групп и Тюмень] неоднократно совершали преступления”, и что
деньги российской организованной преступности “проходили через Альфа-банк”.

Разведывательные источники Ройса
Имея на руках эти статьи, Ройс связался с одним из своих анонимных источников в ЦРУ.
Ройс спросил чиновника о докладе, указанном в статье Washington Post, и о любой информации, которой он располагает об “Альфа-Групп” или Тюмени, не зависящей от этого доклада.
информацию об “Альфа-Групп” или Тюмени, не зависящую от этого отчета. Royce Dep.
at 231:9-232:3. Источник отказался предоставить Ройсу копию или кратко изложить содержание отчета, а также отказался сообщить Ройсу информацию об “Альфа-Групп” или Тюмени, не зависящую от этого отчета.
и отказался сообщить Ройсу, кто был автором отчета. Однако источник
признал, что отчет существует и что источник читал отчет, и подтвердил, что
информация о преступлении, описанная в отчете, “совпадает с тем, что было у агентства”. Royce Dep. at
233:11-236:14. Как описал Ройс, источник “фактически подтвердил” то, что было
описано в статье Washington Post. Royce Dep. at 237:16-237:20.
Затем Ройс обратился ко второму источнику из разведывательного сообщества, бывшему сотруднику ЦРУ Ричарду Палмеру.
Ричарду Палмеру, который в начале 1990-х годов был начальником представительства ЦРУ в России, а затем работал в частном секторе в России.
работал в частном секторе в российской банковской индустрии. Palmer Dep. at 115:8-115:22;
Sullivan Decl., Ex. 47 (отредактированные показания Палмера перед Конгрессом). Палмер предоставил Ройсу
полную копию статьи “Версии”, которую Палмер ранее читал только в сокращенном виде.
В статье признавалось, что дело Илюхина могло быть “коммунистической провокацией 29
направленной против трех честных бизнесменов”. Id. В сокращенном варианте статьи объясняется, что она была
написана Олегом Лурье. Позже Ройс расспросил одного из своих других источников о Лурье; источник сказал Ройсу, что у него “репутация настоящего копателя, который придумывает истории, которые не придумывают другие”.
другие не придумывают, но у него был случайный недостаток, и это то, что иногда он был склонен
несколько преувеличивать”, и “иногда он может быть немного растянут в описании
материала”. Royce Dep. at 92:20-93:22, 95:16-95:18.
16
Еженедельник “Банки и биржи”. Royce Dep. at 102:13-105:13. В статье говорилось, что
газета получила отчет, содержащий обвинения в уголовных преступлениях против должностных лиц “Альфа-групп”.
который Илюхин передал в Министерство внутренних дел для расследования. В статье сообщалось
подробно излагались обвинения, содержащиеся в докладе, которые включали утверждения о том, что Авен и Фридман занимались
в торговле наркотиками и имели связи с российской организованной преступностью. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 49.
29
В это время Ройс получил другие статьи, в которых содержались аналогичные обвинения против Авена и
Фридмана. Ройс ознакомился со статьей в “Экономисте” от 4 декабря 1999 года, в которой повторялись утверждения о том.
что тюменские чиновники “запугивали судей и журналистов”, что “источники его финансирования
неясны”, и что “за кулисами им управляют бандиты”. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 33 at 1 (электронное письмо Ройсу, содержащее статью в Economist).
Ройсу, содержащее статью в журнале Economist). Бывший высокопоставленный сотрудник Госдепартамента также
предоставил Ройсу несколько российских новостных статей об “Альфа-Групп”, в которых содержались
утверждения о том, что “Фридман дружил со многими ведущими криминальными боссами”. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 51 at
17-18.
C. Российско-американский специалист и доклад ФСБ
Затем Ройс связался с другим анонимным источником, а именно с российско-американским специалистом
по деловой практике в Советском Союзе, который имел несколько контактов в российском правоохранительном сообществе.
у которого было несколько контактов в российском правоохранительном сообществе. Royce Dep. at 139:17-140:6, 433:10-434:19. Ройс описывает этого
человека как “чрезвычайно осведомленного о преступной деятельности” в российском деловом мире

Ройс встречался со специалистом более часа, в течение которого специалист рассказал о владении и управлении компанией “Альфа
Group и Тюмени, а также о разногласиях по поводу ее приватизации. Специалист объяснил
Ройсу, что “ни одна крупная нефтяная компания не свободна от преступной деятельности”, что все это происходило и в “Альфа-Групп”, и в “Тюмени”.
Групп” и Тюмени, включая “взяточничество, уклонение от уплаты налогов, [и] коррупцию”, что у него “мало сомнений в том.
сомневается, что [Альфа-Групп и Тюмень] совершали преступления во многих случаях”, и что
деньги российской организованной преступности “проходили через Альфа-банк”. Royce Dep. at 151:7-154:22;
Ex. 52 (рукописные заметки).
Ройс спросил российско-американского специалиста о докладе, который Илюхин
переслал российским правоохранительным органам. Специалист сказал Ройсу, что он связался со своим источником в Федеральной службе России.
со своим источником в Федеральном бюро безопасности России (“ФСБ”, ведомство-преемник КГБ).
чтобы спросить о докладе, и источник сообщил ему, что ФСБ будет расследовать эти
утверждения. Когда специалист повторил свой вопрос через пару месяцев, источник сообщил ему, что
расследование было “отложено до лучших времен” по политическим соображениям. Royce Dep. at
163:8-164:22.
Через некоторое время после их встречи специалист отправил Ройсу по факсу сокращенную копию доклада
(“отчет ФСБ”). Royce Dep. at 162:1-163:8. На титульном листе факса специалист написал примечание
лист:
Прилагаю открытое письмо Илюхину, о котором шла речь. Оно сокращено и
переведено. Другой документ, который я обнаружил, – это несокращенная версия на
оригинале на русском языке. Я бы все же рекомендовал заглянуть в думский архив
на предмет дальнейших действий со стороны Илюхина.
P.S. Пожалуйста, не воспринимайте эту статью как Евангелие.
См. Льюис деп. на 110:5-110:9; Смит деп. на 106:10-106-15; Хеллер деп. на 172:16- 30
173:7; Prince Dep. at 89:11-89:18.
18
Pl. Ex. 8. Ройс объясняет, что он понял постскриптум, означающий, что он не должен “полагать.
что каждый бит информации является точным”, и что “как и во всем, что приходит из России, будьте
осторожным”. Royce Dep. at 192:4-192:9. Ройс не показывал титульный лист и не обсуждал его содержание
его содержание с Льюисом, Хеллером, проверяющим факты в статье (Питером Смитом) или редактором (Ричардом Принсом)30.
(Ричард Принс).30
Отчет ФСБ состоит из восьми страниц. Первая страница содержит заголовок, гласящий:
Этот меморандум содержит выдержки из письма, отправленного анонимной группой агентов Федерального бюро безопасности главе администрации США.
Эта записка содержит выдержки из письма, отправленного анонимной группой агентов Федерального бюро безопасности главе Комиссии по национальной безопасности,
Виктору Ивановичу Илюкину. Хотя мы не смогли определить
достоверность обвинений, содержащихся в письме, наши источники подтверждают, что они могут быть
основой для текущего расследования, проводимого федеральными властями в Москве”.
Заявление Салливана, вып. 29, стр. 1. Далее в документе описывается ряд
уголовных обвинений, связанных с “Альфа-Групп”, включая следующее:

• Альфа-Групп “сотрудничала” с различными российскими преступными группировками (включая мафию Солнцево).
  Солнцевской мафией). Ид. в 3.
• Фридман и Авен “предположительно участвовали в транзите наркотиков из Юго-Восточной
  Азии через Россию в Европу”. Id. at 3.
• Фридман “тайно сотрудничал с оперативниками КГБ” в 1980-х годах. Id.
  at 4.
• Министерство внутренних дел провело обыск в зданиях “Альфа Эко” в апреле 1995 года и
  В одном из зданий “Альфа-Эко” были обнаружены наркотики и другая компрометирующая документация. Сайт
  обыск был проведен в связи с тем, что в конце марта жители г.
  Хабаровска были “отравлены, по-видимому, сахаром”; в “ходе
  расследования выяснилось, что отравление произошло в результате того, что большая
  большой дозы какого-то наркотического вещества, которым был загрязнен сахар”, и позже было
  позже было установлено, что контейнеры, в которых перевозился сахар, были арендованы
  одним из руководителей “Альфа-Групп”.
  *** Переведено с помощью http://www.DeepL.com/Translator (бесплатная версия) ***

Авен “встретился с представителем колумбийской наркоторговли, Гилберто Роригесом
Орексуэлем, известным под прозвищем “Шахматист”. Встреча была проведена отчасти для того, чтобы
заключить соглашение о переводе денег в “Альфа-банк” из офшорных
зон, таких как Багамы, Гибралтар и другие”. Id. at 8.

• Альфа-Групп” полагалась на контакты Авена, чтобы “транспортировать наркотики в больших масштабах”. Id. at
  8.
  Sullivan Decl., Ex. 29.
  Российско-американский специалист сказал Ройсу, что “у него не было сомнений в том.
  в том, что материал поступил из ФСБ”. Royce Dep. at 198:11-199:1. Специалист сказал
  Ройсу, что “там были утверждения, которые он лично не мог подтвердить, и другие, которые
  в целом он мог, учитывая то, что он знал, что он сам знал”. Royce Dep. at 199:2-200:2.
  Специалист объяснил, что у него не было личных сведений о том, что Фридман и Авен “были
  причастны к наркотикам”, но он знал об их “участии” в солнцевской
  и что он может подтвердить, что у “Альфа-Групп” были “деловые отношения” и “тесные связи” с организованной преступностью.
  тесные отношения” с организованной преступностью. Royce Dep. at 155:1-157:8.
  Ройс покинул беседу с российско-американским специалистом убежденным в том, что отчет ФСБ
  не был “фальшивым документом”. Royce Dep. at 185:10-187:1. Он считал, что существует “большая
  вероятность того, что он действительно был из Федерального бюро безопасности, что некоторые агенты, один или несколько агентов,
  собрали материал, но не хотели быть идентифицированными и представили его
  анонимно”. Royce Decl. at 198:3-199:1. Ройс никогда не идентифицировал и не разговаривал с
  анонимными сотрудниками, которые предоставили Илюхину отчет ФСБ. Pls.’ Mem. Ex. 7 в ¶¶ 31, 33-36
  (ответы на допросы); Royce Dep. at 201:13-18, 209:1-210:5. Ройс также не выяснил.
  Письма Илюхина, ставшие известными в ходе этого судебного процесса, подтверждают, что 31.
  Илюхин действительно получил доклад ФСБ от сотрудников ФСБ, которые “боялись за свою
  профессиональной карьеры” и поэтому хотели остаться неизвестными, и что Илюхин затем передал
  доклад директору ФСБ и заместителю председателя Министерства внутренних дел
  (“МВД”) с указанием, чтобы эти ведомства расследовали обвинения. См. Sullivan Decl,
  Экз. 21, 22 (письма Илюхина от 26 ноября 1997 года); Декларация Боумана, Экз. 30 (письмо Илюхина от 22 мая 2003 года).
  от Илюхина). Через месяц МВД сообщило Илюхину, что было установлено.
  что “Альфа-Групп” “находится под следствием в связи с рядом уголовных дел”.
  включая дело, в котором московские таможенники обнаружили оружие и боеприпасы в грузе.
  адресованном “Альфа Эко”. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 23 (письмо от 24 декабря 1997 года от В. Васильева в адрес Илюхина).
  Илюхину).
  20
  был ли кто-либо из должностных лиц лично знаком с изложенными в нем утверждениями. Pls.’ Mem.
  Ex. 7 в ¶¶¶ 37-44.31
  D. Палмер и отчет КГБ
  Затем Ройс договорился о встрече с Палмером и Джоном Форбсом, сотрудником таможенной службы США.
  офицером таможенной службы США. Royce Dep. at 244:6-249:20. Ройс попросил обоих мужчин поискать дополнительную информацию
  которую они могут иметь об “Альфа Групп”. Royce Dep. at 248:12-251:9. По словам Ройса,
  Форбс сказал ему, что он ничего не знает об истцах, кроме того, “что он прочитал в газетах”.
  газетах”. Royce Dep. at 251:10-252:4. Палмер, с другой стороны, нашел в своих файлах после
  после встречи меморандум с подробным изложением информации, которая была предоставлена ему летом
  1995 года бывшим майором КГБ (“отчет майора КГБ”). Royce Dep. at 258:10-258:20.
  Палмер передал Ройсу копию отчета майора КГБ. В отчете объясняется, что он содержит
  записи со встречи в сентябре 1995 года с бывшим майором КГБ, который был близок к
  руководством двух российских банков. В отчете подробно излагались следующие утверждения:
• “Что касается Альфа-Банка, то имеются доказательства его причастности к отмыванию денег
  отмыванием денег российских и латиноамериканских наркокартелей. Альфа-Банк был [создан] КГБ
  созданным КГБ в 1987 году… в конечном итоге превратился в банк, помогающий перемещать деньги”.
  Id. at 1
  

“Альфа-банк” был основан на средства КГБ и Коммунистической партии. На сайте
К тому времени в этот банк пришли несколько “изгоев” – бывших сотрудников КГБ.

• часто принося с собой свои связи в криминальном мире. . . . Они быстро
  определили, что торговля наркотиками принесет самую высокую прибыль при
  буквально без риска в России”. Id.
• “Связи Альфа-банка с наркоторговцами были раскрыты с осени
  1991 года – с момента назначения Петра Авена на пост министра
  внешней торговли. В то время был налажен крупный канал транзита героина.
  установлен”. Id.
• “Однажды в одном из сибирских регионов произошел забавный случай. Там было зарегистрировано несколько
  случаи странного опьянения, зарегистрированные у местных жителей – это опьянение
  было вызвано определенными наркотиками. Выяснилось, что наркотики содержались
  в сахаре, который эти люди покупали у некоего железнодорожника. Сайт
  человек признался, что украл мешок сахара из вагона поезда. Позже
  было установлено, что груз “сахара” принадлежал фирме “АЛЬФА-ЭКО”. .
  . филиалу “АЛЬФА-банка”. Было возбуждено уголовное дело…
  но были быстро прекращены”. Id. at 2.
  Ройс спросил Палмера о личности агента КГБ и о том, может ли Ройс поговорить с ним или
  может ли Палмер связаться с ним и задать ему дополнительные вопросы. Палмер отказался раскрыть
  личность майора и сказал, что Палмер даже не знает, как его теперь разыскать.
  Palmer Dep. at 30:11-31:14. Палмер рассказал Ройсу, что бывший офицер КГБ работал с двумя банками, основанными американцами.
  работал с двумя банками, которые были основаны КГБ, когда Палмер разговаривал с ним. Royce
  Dep. at 327:8-327:19. Ройс спросил Палмера, передавал ли он этот документ кому-либо еще,
  и Палмер ответил, что нет.

Дальше – на английском:

Royce asked Palmer if Palmer believed the KGB agent was credible. Palmer explained
that “based on the fact that he had given me other information, which I found to be very
consistent and very accurate,” that “he knew what he was talking about.” Palmer added that “in
all my dealings with him, I found him to be credible,” and that “I had seen nothing in the
information to indicate that he was anything other than who he said he was and his information
was accurate.” Palmer Dep. at 30:11-31:14, 114:13-114:19, 147:13-148:2; Royce Dep. at 290:1-
290:15.
33
Royce concluded that many of the allegations in the 1997 FSB report had been
corroborated by the KGB major report written two years earlier. Royce Dep. at 278:10-278:15,
407:10-408:8. He explained in his deposition in this case that the “KGB and the FSB that
succeeded it I believe employ hundreds of thousands of officers and agents,” and the odds “were
astronomic that the KGB officers would perhaps have been one of the FSB officers who had
provided the report in ’97.” Royce Dep. at 407:12-407:17. Royce also testified that he found the
information credible because it had been given to someone who “the former U.S. intelligence
official deemed to be credible” and “who was not a journalist,” reducing the likelihood that it was
“compromat,” the Russian term for the practice, common during this period, of arranging for the
Palmer explained that when he started talking to Royce, he set out ground rules: “I 34
never wanted to be quoted, I never wanted to be referred to[,] [and] I didn’t want any of my
information referred to.” Palmer Dep. at 32:16-33:3. Palmer provided the information as
“background material” that “would perhaps provide him a lead to other things to look for on the
area.” Palmer Dep. at 80:19-80:22. Palmer claims that when the article was published he called
Royce to tell him that he was “surprised” to see even an oblique reference to him in the article
and that he “thought we had an agreement that that was not to happen.” Palmer says that Royce
was apologetic and said that he believed the ground rules had changed, and that Palmer
expressed anger that Royce had violated their agreement. Palmer Dep. at 80:22-81:15, 162:19-
167:10. Royce disputes that this conversation occurred. Royce Dep. at 451:10-451:13, 465:2-
470:14.
These were not the only sources Royce contacted. At one point prior to publishing the 35
article, Royce contacted Jeffrey Robinson, an author of a book on international organized crime.
Royce asked Robinson whether he had any information tying the plaintiffs with narcotics activity
or organized crime figures. Robinson told him that he did not have any material that bore on
those allegations. Royce Dep. at 274:13-22, 276:3-9.
23
publication of compromising (and often false) material about one’s competitors or rivals. Royce
Dep. at 407:17-407:22; Tolchinsky Dep. at 45:16-45:22; Winer Dep. at 130:16-131:18.34
E. Preparing the Article for Press
Royce testified that, at this point, he believed the allegations of criminal conduct were
credible based on the “total body of evidence” that was available at that time, which included the
FSB report, the KGB major report, the multiple intelligence sources (the CIA source, the
Russian-American specialist, and Palmer), the Versiya and other articles, the published 35
Washington Post and Economist articles, and the fact that the CIA and BP Amoco possessed
information suggesting criminality on the part of Tyumen officials. Royce Dep. at 278:12 to
279:2. Royce and Heller sought responses from the plaintiffs regarding the allegations. Heller
called Tyumen’s counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. One of the attorneys told Heller
that CPI was “totally off the mark.” When Heller mentioned that they had corroborating
evidence from intelligence sources, the attorney directed Heller to Tyumen’s public relations
The FSB report notes that Fridman and Aven were “born . . . Jewish,” falsely asserts
36
that Aven’s older brother is a successful Israeli businessman who works with the Mossad (Aven
has no siblings), and states that while living in Vienna in the late 1980s or early 1990s, Aven met
with “a certain Aizenberg” who was a representative of Israeli intelligence (Aven says that no
24
people at Fleishman-Hilliard. Heller Dep. at 241:8-12. Heller contacted the account executive,
who also provided a denial, and referred Heller to Alexander Tolchinsky, a member of the Board
of Directors of Alfa Bank. Heller Dep. at 203:21-204:9.
Tolchinsky dismissed the allegations as “nonsense.” Tolchinsky Dep. at 64:17-65:1.
Tolchinsky explained that the allegations were “not new,” and that they amounted to the same
“old story that had been reprinted by various obscure Russian publications from mid ’90s.”
Royce Dep. at 42:8-43:2. He expressed the view that the entire “bag of dirt” about Alfa was
“compromat,” which is the term for the Russian practice of arranging for the publication
(sometimes through payments) of compromising material about ones competitors or rivals.
Tolchinsky Dep. at 45:16-22; Royce Dep. at 383:14-385:1; Winer Dep. at 130:16-131:18.
Tolchinsky told Royce that the stories were planted by an Alfa Group competitor who he
declined to identify. Tolchinsky advised Royce to ask around to learn more about the nature of
compromat and the Russian “yellow press.” Tolchinsky Dep. at 42:8-44:7. Royce did not
contact Fridman or Aven to ask them to comment about the piece; he explained in his deposition
that he did not believe that they spoke English, and that he did not hire an interpreter because
they were “pressed for time at that point” to publish the piece. Royce Dep. at 388:18-390:5
The article proceeded through CPI’s normal fact-checking and editing process. The
article was fact-checked by a researcher named Peter Smith. Smith Dep. at 54:11-54:16. Smith
read the FSB and KGB major reports, and raised with Royce and Heller an anti-Semitic tone he
detected in the documents. Smith Dep. at 101:7-101:18, 106:16-107:6. Royce responded that
36
such meeting occurred). Sullivan Decl., Ex. 29 at 424-26; Aven Decl. ¶ 18.
Lewis testified that he had a conversation at one point with Royce in which Royce 37
indicated that Soros might have had a copy of the BP Amoco report, but expressed concern that
Soros was a funder of CPI. Royce Dep. at 237:2-238:16; Lewis Dep. at 150:11-21. Lewis
testified that he told Royce that he should do what he needed to do to get information on the
article, and that the fact that Soros funded CPI should be deemed irrelevant. Lewis Dep. at
150:11-21. Royce testified that he did not have a conversation with Lewis before deciding not to
call Soros. Royce Dep. at 241:13-241-16.
25
anti-Semitism was common in Russia during the period and therefore, if anything, that tone was
“an indication of authenticity.” Smith Dep. at 101:7-18; 106:16-107:6. Smith relates that Royce
and Heller “indicated that they were persuaded that the documents were reliable, that the
allegations in them were corroborated by one another and gave a solid basis for the story.” Smith
Dep. at 101:13-101:18. Royce pointed out to Smith “that these were two separate sources,
separated in time from each other; one from the former KGB agent, one from the FSB.” He
explained that the “separation . . . made it unlikely that it was one bad source that was feeding
both of them.” Smith Dep. at 101:19-102:12. Smith said that Royce was “emphatic” that the
allegations were true. Smith Dep. at 102:11-102:12. Smith was left with the impression that “all
the questions and issues I had raised had been resolved.” Smith Dep. at 109:21-110:4.
Lewis gave the final approval for the article to be published. Lewis Dep. at 59:17-60:4.
Lewis remembers that Royce “felt secure” about the basis for the article. Lewis Dep. at 236:13-
237:19. Royce and Heller both testified that they were confident that the allegations were 37
credible at the time the article was published. Royce Dep. at 278:7-279:11; Heller Dep. at
427:20-438:10. The period of time from the assignment to the publication of the piece was
approximately a week. Lewis Dep. at 32:1-32:13. On August 2, 2000, CPI published the article
online on The Public I. The article remains on the CPI web site to this day.
26
F. The Article
The article was titled “Cheney Led Halliburton to Feast at Federal Trough.” Sullivan
Decl., Ex. 1. The article reports that Halliburton has benefitted from billions of dollars in federal
contracts and loans under the stewardship of Cheney, and notes as one example the loan to
Tyumen guaranteed by the Export-Import bank. The article advises that Halliburton lobbied for
the loan, and that it would receive $292 million of the loan to refurbish oil fields in Siberia for
Tyumen. The article then notes that BP Amoco commissioned a report on Tyumen, which was
provided to the CIA. The article notes that the BP Amoco report contains two and a half pages
labeled “criminal situation,” that the CIA passed the report on to the Ex-Im bank, and that the
CIA told the bank that the report “tracked” its own information. Article at 3.
The article notes that allegations of organized crime and drug activities “involving
Tyumen’s parent company, the Alfa Group, had been made public in Russia last year,” and that
the allegations are “contained in a report delivered in 1997 by anonymous officials from the FSB
(the Russian equivalent of the FBI) to the national security committee of the Duma, or lower
house of parliament).” Article at 3. According to the article, the Russian-American specialist
explained that the allegations had been the subject of an FSB investigation that had been “put
away for a better day,” and that key elements of the FSB report were “virtually identical” to those
provided to an American intelligence officer two years earlier by a former KGB major.
The article then describes the allegations in the FSB and KGB major reports, including
that:
• The KGB major report “and the FSB report claim that Alfa Bank, one of Russia’s
largest and most profitable, as well as Alfa Eko, a trading company, had been
deeply involved in the early 1990s in laundering of Russian and Colombian drug
money and in trafficking drugs from the Far East to Europe.” Id. at 3.
27
• “The former KGB major . . . said that Alfa Bank was founded with party and KGB
funds, and quickly attracted rogue agents who . . . ‘quickly determined that
dealing in drugs would bring the highest profits with literally no risk in Russia.'”
Id. at 4.
• “The FSB report . . . claimed that Alfa Group’s top executives, oligarchs Mikhail
Fridman and Pyotr Aven, ‘allegedly participated in the transit of drugs from
Southeast Asia through Russia and into Europe.'” Id. at 4.
• “Both the FSB and KGB major reports cite an event in 1995 in which residents of
a Siberian town became ‘intoxicated,’ according to the American’s report, and
‘poisoned,’ according to the FSB report, after they had eaten heroin-laced sugar
that had been shipped in a rail car container leased to Alfa Eko, which specializes
in the shipment of foodstuffs.” Id. at 4.
• “Both reports claim that Alfa bank has laundered drug funds from Russian and
Colombian drug cartels. The FSB document claims that at the end of 1993, a top
Alfa official met with Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, the now-imprisoned financial
mastermind of Colombia’s notorious Cali cartel, “to conclude an agreement about
the transfer of money into Alfa Bank from offshore zones such as the Bahamas,
Gibraltar and others.” The article notes that the KGB major report “is unclear
about Alfa’s alleged role with Rodriguez,” but reports that there was evidence
“regarding [Alfa Bank’s] involvement with the money laundering of . . . Latin
American drug cartels.” Id. at 5.
• “The former KGB officer claimed that the Alfa empire had its roots in a
cooperative formed by KGB officers in 1987. . . .” The FSB report claims that top
officials of the Alfa Group ‘cooperated’ with a number of Russian crime
organizations,” and that the Russian-American specialist, “who has a wide array
of contacts inside Russia’s law enforcement and intelligence communities, agreed
that Alfa Bank, as well as others, are used by the Solntsevo crime family.”
The article notes that the KGB officer was “at the time working for two banks formed by
the KGB,” and that he had been a part of the Soviet spy agency’s “ideological counterintelligence
branch,” id. at 3, but does not mention the anti-Semitic tone of the article or discuss the
phenomenon of compromat. The introduction of the article emphasizes that the claims of drug
trafficking and organized crime funds “are hotly disputed by the Russian oil firm’s holding
company.” Id. at 1. The article quotes Tolchinsky as stating that the allegations are “nonsense,”
and “[a]nother Alfa official” that “the reports were planted by representatives of a competing
company, whom he would not identify.” Id. at 4. The article also quotes an unidentified Akin
Gump lawyer as describing the claims as “way off the mark,” and an individual from Tyumen’s
public relations firm as stating that the firm had performed a background check on Tyumen and
that “there was no concern” about the alleged mob ties.
The article closes by noting that “Tyumen could have significant access to the White
House should the Bush-Cheney ticket win in the November presidential elections,” noting ties
between Tyumen’s legal counsel and the Bush campaign, and returning to a discussion of
Halliburton’s campaign expenditures and lobbying endeavors. Id. at 6. The article mentions that
it talked to Halliburton and the Ex-Im bank about criminal allegations tying Tyumen and its
officers to Russian organized crime, and states that an Ex-Im attorney said that the bank
concluded that there was “no evidence to support the allegations” in the BP-Amoco report.

III. Procedural History
Fridman, Aven, OAO Alfa Bank and ZAO Alfa Eco commenced this action against CPI,
Royce, and Heller on September 14, 2000. The complaint seeks compensatory and punitive
damages and a permanent injunction preventing defendants from continuing to publish the
article. On May 3, 2004, following a lengthy period of discovery, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment (along with two accompanying motions going to the merits of plaintiffs’
claims). On June 1, 2004, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendants’ motion for
summary judgment for exceeding the Court’s page limits, and required defendants to file a
renewed motion. On June 18, 2004, defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment.
The motion is now fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing on the motion on February 3, 2005.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial
responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may successfully support its
motion by “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions
of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude
summary judgment, the court must regard the non-movant’s statements as true and accept all
evidence and make all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3d 1272, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir.
2003). A non-moving party, however, must establish more than the “mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence” in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. By pointing to the absence of
evidence proffered by the non-moving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
Where, as here, the Court will be the trier of fact on an issue if the case were to proceed
to trial, the rules of summary judgment are altered. In such a case, the “Court is not confined to
deciding questions of law, but also may . . . draw a derivative inference from undisputed
subsidiary facts, even if those facts could support an inference to the contrary, so long as the
inference does not depend upon an evaluation of witness credibility.” Cook v. Babbitt, 819 F.
Supp. 1, 11 & n.11 (D.D.C. 1993); see Ramallo v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 884, 888 (D.D.C. 1996)
(“Because the Court would be the ultimate trier of fact in this case if it went to trial, ‘[c]onflict
concerning the ultimate and decisive conclusion to be drawn from undisputed facts does not
prevent rendition of a summary judgment.'”) (quoting Fox v. Johnson & Winsatt, Inc., 127 F.2d
729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
ANALYSIS
To preserve the “national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” the Constitution sets a demanding bar for “public
figures” to recover for acts of defamation. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964). A public figure may prevail in a defamation suit only if he or she can produce “clear and
convincing proof” that the challenged publication was made with “actual malice” — i.e., with
“knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Masson v.
New York, 501 U.S. 496, 509 (1991); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974);
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
Defendants move for summary judgment on two independent grounds. First, they
maintain that the publication of the CPI article is governed by a “fair reporting privilege” that
provides an absolute immunity from suit and therefore removes any need to consider the public
figure and actual malice questions. Second, they contend in the alternative that plaintiffs are
limited public figures concerning the issue of Russian corruption and the future of Western aid
and investment, and that plaintiffs have not come forward with clear and convincing evidence
that defendants published the statements in the CPI article with actual malice. The Court
addresses each of these contentions in turn.
The FSB and the Ministry of the Interior are both Russian law enforcement agencies. 38

I. The Fair Reporting Privilege
Defendants contend that this case can be resolved through the application of the fair
reporting privilege. This privilege “is a recognized exception to the common law rule that the
republisher of a defamation is deemed to have adopted the underlying defamatory statements as
its own.” White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The privilege
extends to “the report of any official proceeding, or any action taken by any officers or agency of
the government of the United States, or of any State or of any of its subdivisions,” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. d (1977), and will protect an article when it is “apparent either from
specific attribution or from the overall context that the article is quoting, paraphrasing, or
otherwise drawing upon official documents or proceedings,” and the article is a “fair and
accurate” account of the document or proceeding,” Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779
F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Defendants maintain that the fair reporting privilege protects the CPI article because
practically all of the challenged statements in the piece are attributed to the “FSB report,” a
memorandum delivered by anonymous Federal Security Bureau agents to Victor Ilyukhin,
Chairman of the Security Committee of the Russian Duma, containing various allegations of
misconduct concerning the leadership of the Alfa Group. The evidence in the record shows that
Ilyukhin took action on the FSB report, passing it on to the Director of the FSB and the Deputy
Chairman of the Ministry of the Interior (“MVD”) with the instruction that those agencies
investigate the allegations. See Sullivan Decl., Ex. 21, 22 (letters from Ilyukhin). The MVD 38
reported back to Ilyukhin a month later that it had been established that Alfa Group was “being
See White, 909 F.2d at 512 (holding that fair and accurate reporting privilege extended 39
to articles reporting on a series of letters a police union wrote to a mayor alleging that irregular
procedures were used in the drug test of a police captain, which the mayor then passed on to the
police chief, who created an investigatory commission on the issue; “it would be untenable to
make a distinction between a report about an official proceeding and that which, for all purposes,
is the subject matter of the proceeding”) (quotation omitted)); see also Reeves v. American
Broadcasting Co., 719 F.2d 602, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1983) (fair reporting privilege applies to
“reports of charges made to a grand jury,” even though “[n]o formal charges were ever filed
against any individual or corporate entity”); Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 139-40 (3d Cir.
1981) (applying fair reporting privilege to magazine’s report of FBI documents that “express only
tentative and preliminary conclusions that the FBI never adopted as accurate”).
The article explains that the FSB report was “delivered in 1997 by anonymous officials 40
from the FSB (the Russian equivalent of the FBI) to the national security committee of the
Duma, or lower house of parliament,” and that according to a source, the “allegations contained
in the 1997 report have been the subject of an investigation by the FSB but that the probe, for
unexplained reasons, had been put away for a better day.” Article at 3. The article then goes on
to attribute explicitly to the FSB report each of the allegations discussed in the article that are
contained in the FSB report (using language such as the “FSB report . . . claimed” and the “FSB
report said”). This more than satisfies the attribution requirement for the privilege. See White,
909 F.2d at 528 (attribution requirement met where report describes the relevant documents and
then “consistently attributed the reported facts to those documents”); Dameron, 779 F.2d at 739
(report need only be “written in such a manner that the average reader would be unlikely to
understand the article (or the pertinent section thereof) to be a report on or summary of an official
document or proceeding”).
Plaintiffs point to minor inaccuracies in the article’s description of the FSB report (for 41
instance, the article states that bags of sugar in an Alfa Eco railcar were laced with heroin, while
the FSB report does not specify the nature of the drugs in the bags). However, the law requires
only that the article provide a “substantially” accurate portrait of the document, and the CPI
article plainly meets this standard. White, 909 F.2d at 527-28; compare Dameron, 779 F.2d at
32
investigated in connection with a number of criminal cases,” including a case in which Moscow
customs officials found arms and ammunitions in a shipment addressed to Alfa Eco. Sullivan
Decl., Ex. 23 (letter from Vasiliev to Ilyukhin).
The Court agrees with defendants that each of the ordinary prerequisites to application of
the fair reporting privilege is met in this case: the FSB report is an “official document” for
purposes of the privilege, the CPI article paraphrases or draws upon the FSB report, and the 39 40
CPI article is a substantially accurate account of the report. Nevertheless, the privilege is 41
739 (reports fall outside privilege where they were “garbled or fragmentary to the point where a
false imputation is made about the plaintiff which would not be present had a full and accurate
report been made”).
33
unavailable to defendants in this case, because it does not extend to the official reports of the
actions of a foreign government.
The Fourth Circuit so held in Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988), in which
the court refused to extend the privilege to a United States news agency report of a South Korean
government press release. Reasoning that “[w]e are familiar with the workings of our
government and consider it to be open and reliable,” while “[f]oreign governments, like
nongovernmental sources of information, are not necessarily familiar, open, reliable, or
accountable,” the Fourth Circuit declined to “provide a blanket privilege to those who report the
activities of foreign governments.” Id. at 879-80. The court then held that applying “the
privilege in a piecemeal fashion would be extremely difficult,” placing the court in the untenable
position of attempting to determine whether a foreign state exhibits the “openness and reliability
that warrant an extension of the privilege.” Id. The court therefore concluded that the privilege
should not apply to reports on the acts of foreign governments.
This Court agrees with and follows the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit. Indeed, the
Restatement adopts the same approach, explicitly limiting the compass of the privilege to reports
of the proceedings or actions of “the government of the United States, or of any State or of any of
its subdivisions,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. d (1977), and the D.C. Court of
Appeals and the D.C. Circuit have both looked to the Restatement in the past in assessing the fair
reporting privilege. See White, 909 F.2d at 527; Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424
A.2d 78, 88 (D.C. 1980). Finally, even if the better course would be to assess the application of
This is the approach advocated by the dissenting opinion in Lee, 849 F.2d at 881, and 42
apparently adopted by the district court in Friedman v. Israel Labour Party, 957 F. Supp. 701, 714
(E.D. Pa. 1997), which held that “[b]y everyone’s standards, Israel is an open and reliable
democracy,” and therefore the fair reporting privilege could extend to reports on its official acts.
The Court notes that the D.C. Circuit indicated in White that it is inclined to conclude 43
that the fair reporting privilege is qualified rather than absolute, meaning that it could be
overcome by a showing of actual malice. See White, 909 F.2d at 527. Therefore, even if the
Court were to extend the privilege to the CPI article, the Court would nonetheless need to
proceed to the actual malice inquiry.
34
the privilege to a foreign state on a case-by-case basis, the defendants in this case allege that 42
Russia during this period was a “corrupt system run by crony capitalists,” Def. Mem. at 12-13,
hardly the showing of “openness and reliability” one would presumably look for in extending the
privilege. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the fair reporting privilege does not protect the
CPI article.
43
II. Public Figures and Actual Malice
Defendants argue in the alternative that plaintiffs are public figures, and that plaintiffs
cannot prove actual malice as a matter of law. These issues will be assessed separately.
A. Public Figures
The Supreme Court has identified two categories of public figures. A general public
figure is an individual of “general fame or notoriety in the community” who has assumed a
“pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. General public figures
are limited for the most part to those well-known “celebrities” whose names have become a
“household word,” and who therefore can be regarded as having “knowingly relinquished [their]
anonymity in return for fame, fortune, or influence.” Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 771. Such a
person has entered public life “for all purposes and in all contexts,” and therefore must prove
35
actual malice in all defamation cases. Id. at 771. Defendants do not contend that plaintiffs rise to
the level of general public figures.
Far more common than the general public figure is the “limited public figure,” an
individual who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352;
Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 772. The D.C. Circuit has set out a three-part inquiry to determine
whether a plaintiff is a limited public figure. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297-98. First, the court
must isolate an existing “public controversy” at issue, because the scope of the controversy in
which the plaintiff involves himself defines the bounds of the public presence. Id. at 1297; see
Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 772. Second, the court should assess whether the plaintiffs have
achieved more than a trivial or tangential prominence in the debate. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at

Finally, the “alleged defamation must have been germane to the plaintiff’s participation in
the controversy.” Id. at 1298.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are limited public figures for purposes of the public
controversy involving corruption in post-Soviet Russia and the future of Western aid and
investment in the country. Def. Mem. at 9. The public figure question is one of law that the
Court must resolve itself, looking at the facts “taken as a whole, through the eyes of a reasonable
person.” See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966); Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1293.
Following a careful review of the parties’ arguments and the entire record in this case, the Court
has concluded that plaintiffs are public figures for purposes of the limited controversy identified
by defendants.
First, defendants have isolated a “public controversy” within the meaning of Waldbaum.
The rise of the oligarchs and the decline of the Russian economy into what one observer
For just a few of the numerous books that have been written about the transformation 44
of the Russian economy and the response of the Western world in this period, see Marshall I.
Goldman, “The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry” (2003) (excerpted in
Sullivan Decl., Ex. 398); David E. Hoffman, “The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New
Russia” (2002) (excerpted in Sullivan Decl., Ex. 399); Stephen F. Cohen, “Failed Crusade:
America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia” (2001) (excerpted in Sullivan Decl., Ex.
401); Rose Brady, “Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle to Free Its Economy” (1999) (excerpted in
Sullivan Decl., Ex. 396); Chrystia Freeland, “The Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride From
Communism to Capitalism” (2000) (excerpted in Sullivan Decl., Ex. 397).
36
described as a “criminal-syndicalist state” was one of the defining foreign policy controversies of
the 1990s, and the topic of intense discussion in the media, classrooms, think tanks, and the
government of the United States, as well as through the rest of the world. See supra at 2-4. As
the events of this period unfolded, untold millions of Russians lost their savings, millions more
in the West lost their investments, and the world economy was shaken to its core. The choices
made in the period, on the part of Russia and the United States, are still being debated to this
day. A public controversy is a “real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or 44
some segment of it in an appreciable way.” Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296. The controversy in
this case certainly qualifies, and does not differ meaningfully from the controversies found
adequate in other cases. See Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 772 (“public controversy” exists
concerning the “manner in which the United States should respond to the rise of OPEC and the
ensuing energy crisis” and “whether the management and structure of the United States’ private
oil industry was in need of alteration or reform”); Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.,
765 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D.D.C. 1991) (“public controversy” exists over “child abuse, women’s
rights, the intrusion of the state into private affairs, and the limits of punishment for contempt of
court”).
37
Second, plaintiffs have assumed a “special prominence” in the controversy. Waldbaum,
627 F.2d at 1297. They were two of the leading participants in the transformation of the Russian
economy. The economic changes attending the fall of the Soviet Union catapulted the plaintiffs
into an elite class of Russian businesspeople, converting them almost overnight into two of the
richest and most powerful individuals in the country. Plaintiffs not only benefitted from the
economic reforms in the period, but they have influenced the course of those reforms. From the
outset of the campaign of privatization (when Aven was a cabinet minister in the first Yeltsin
administration) to the 1993 coup attempt, to the 1995 near-election defeat of Yeltsin, to the 1998
market crash, the plaintiffs have stepped forward to guide the political and economic direction of
Russia at every turn. Further, plaintiffs have fully engaged in the worldwide debate regarding the
causes and the cure for the corruption that has overcome the Russian economy, and have
themselves been the repeated target of allegations of collusion and illegality. Plaintiffs have
risen to positions of unprecedented influence in the political and economic affairs of their nation
— far from being “trivial” or “tangential” to the upheaval of the Russian economy, they are the
very centerpiece of the public controversy in this case. Id. at 1297.
Finally, the challenged statements in the CPI article were “germane” to the public
controversy. Id. at 1298. The statements set out detailed allegations of corruption and illegal
conduct on the part of two of the Russian oligarchs. This account of plaintiff’s exploits — true or
not — is a component of the debate over the consequences of Russia’s economic reforms and the
corruption that most agree has gripped the post-Soviet economy. At the very least, it can safely
be said that these statements are not “wholly unrelated” to this broader debate. Id. This becomes
even more evident when one steps back and views the comments in relation to the rest of the
article. The allegations of criminal conduct appear amid a report of a discussion of the heated
38
debate regarding a particular form of planned United States aid to the plaintiffs’ oil company, and
the various factors that came to bear on that process, including allegations of corruption and the
intense lobbying (according to the article) of Halliburton and BP Amoco. The entire article
therefore purports to present an example of — and serves to shed light on — the emergence of
corruption in the post-Soviet Russian economy and the ongoing debate in the West about how to
confront it. This relationship more than suffices to satisfy the “germaneness” prong of the
Waldbaum test. See, e.g., Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 773-74 (article discussing alleged nepotism
at an oil company was germane to public controversy on the direction of national energy policy;
“[t]he alleged nepotism by Tavoulareas was not ‘wholly unrelated’ to a public controversy where
the credibility and integrity of representatives of the oil industry had become an issue”).
Several other guideposts bear on the public figure inquiry, and each of them is present in
this case. First, plaintiffs have chosen paths of endeavor that “invite attention and comment.”
Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 773. They are among the richest and most influential businesspeople in
Russia, if not the world. They have taken an active role in the political direction of their country,
and have spoken vocally on the world stage. These choices have placed plaintiffs squarely in the
public light. See, e.g., id. (fact that plaintiff is “president and chief operating officer of one of the
world’s largest multinational corporations” is relevant to “whether that person has ‘invite[d]
attention and comment’ with respect to public issues affecting his business dealings”); Novecon,
977 F. Supp. at 49 (plaintiff’s “impressive resume is a factor in his public figure status”).
Second, Aven and Fridman and their companies have been the subject of widespread
news coverage. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297 (advising that courts should “look to . . . the
extent of press coverage” of the plaintiffs in undertaking the limited public figure analysis);
Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1078 (3d Cir. 1988) (“plaintiffs who
Plaintiffs note that some of these articles are duplicates, and others concern individuals 45
bearing those names but who are not the plaintiffs in this case. Pl. Mem. at 47-48. These are
fair criticisms, but plaintiffs do not claim that this reflects more than a handful of articles.
Plaintiffs also contend that a “significant” number of the articles date from after the publication
of the article at issue here in August 2000, making them irrelevant. The Court doubts that one
can ignore articles published so soon after the date of publication of the article at issue, unless
there is some identifiable reason why those articles do not provide an accurate reflection of the
extent of the media coverage of the plaintiff at the time of publication of the article. The Court
cannot find such a reason in this case (plaintiffs do not claim that there was a spike in publicity as
a result of the CPI article, for example). At any rate, even an April 2001 search of United States
news publications revealed 8,609 pages of English language news articles stretching back to
1990 about plaintiffs and their companies, supra at 10, a showing of media coverage that lends
ample support to the conclusion that plaintiffs are public figures.
39
had appeared frequently in the news could not escape limited public figure status”). An October
2003 internet search of a news database yielded more than 1,100 English language articles since
1990 that mention the name Mikhail Fridman, and more than 1,400 articles that include the name
Pyotr Aven (or variations thereof). See supra at 10. These articles appear in publications 45
ranging from the New York Times to the Russian newspaper Versiya. This media footprint is far
greater than those found sufficient to support public figure status in other cases. See Ellis v.
Time, 1997 WL 863267, at *6 (D.D.C. 1997) (plaintiff is limited public figure where he was the
subject of five articles in newspapers ranging from the Washington Post to the Russian
newspaper Izvestia); Bell, 584 F. Supp. at 131 (plaintiff is limited public figure where “over one
hundred newspaper articles have appeared concerning his various activities during the course of
plaintiff’s career”).
Third, Aven and Fridman enjoy “access to the channels of effective communication” that
enable them to respond to any defamatory statements and influence the course of public debate.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 772-73. They have written articles in Russian
newspapers, given interviews to newspapers and other media outlets throughout the world
For example, shortly after the CPI piece was published, the New York Times 46
conducted an interview with Fridman in which a reporter discussed the allegations of drug
running and criminal ties. The reporter explains that when he “asked Fridman about it, he
shrugged and said, ‘That stuff’s always around.'” John Lloyd, “The Autumn of the Oligarchs,”
The New York Times, Oct. 8, 2000.
40
(including ABC’s Nightline and CNN), spoken on economic reform issues to international
audiences, and developed a well-coordinated and sophisticated public relations strategy through
in-house press departments, external public relations firms, and corporate websites. Plaintiffs
have even given interviews in which they responded to the very allegations made in the CPI
article. These facts also lend strong support to the conclusion that plaintiffs are limited public 46
figures. See Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 784 (D.D.C. 1990) (“[P]laintiff has appeared
as a speaker at many political gatherings and has been interviewed on network television
programs . . . including Nightline, Good Morning America and Cross-Fire (the latter to discuss
[the allegedly defamatory publication]) and in publications . . . demonstrating ‘access to the
channels of effective communication’ that the Supreme Court felt characterized a public figure.”);
Foretich, 765 F. Supp. at 1108 (plaintiff gave statements to press and sat for an interview with a
television crew, “a course of conduct that was likely to attract substantial attention”).
Finally, Aven and Fridman have used their positions to influence the events of their
country and the world, and have assumed a prominent role in the civic life of Russia, associating
closely and openly with the Russian business elite and politicians at the highest positions of
government. Such facts have been held to signify that plaintiffs are public figures who have
voluntarily exposed themselves to public scrutiny and are therefore less deserving of protection
than private persons. See Clyburn, 903 F.2d at 33 (one who “hobnob[s] with high officials . . .
runs the risk that personal tragedies that for less well-connected people would pass unnoticed
This is also not a case where the issue is of private rather than public concern, such as 47
a famous couple’s marital difficulties. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1976).
41
may place him at the heart of a public controversy”); Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 773 (plaintiff
corporate president “thrust himself to the forefront of the national controversy over the state of
the oil industry” and “became an activist” on these issues); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877
F. Supp. 1, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (plaintiff who was a “confident to several Soviet activists such as
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Vladimir Bukovsky” was a
limited public figure).
Plaintiffs raise two principal objections to the conclusion that Aven and Fridman are
limited public figures. First, they contend that the issue of Russian corruption and the future of
Western aid and investment is too generalized to qualify as a public controversy. Pl. Mem. at 49.
However, the public controversy in this case is no more general than controversies that have been
found sufficient in a host of other cases, which include “the methods and influence of lobbyists in
Washington,” Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 251 (1st Cir. 2000); “drug
trafficking,” Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir. 1985);
the “relations between the sexes” and “contemporary standards regarding nudity,” Lerman v.
Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 137 (2d Cir. 1984); and the problem of “child abuse,”
Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
This is not a case where the proposed controversy is so generalized that it would be
“shared by most” — for example, the proposed controversy of “concern about general public
expenditures,” which “relates to most public expenditures” and would transform into a public
figure anyone receiving a public grant. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).47
Plaintiffs’ suggestion that treating them as public figures would convert any participant in the
42
Russian economy into a public figure is practically a non-sequitur. Def. Mem. at 50. As already
discussed at length, plaintiffs were not just any “participant” in the Russian economy, but
assumed positions of unique wealth, influence and renown. See, e.g., McDowell v. Paiewonsky,
769 F.2d 942, 948 (3d Cir. 1985) (concern in Hutchinson not present where the particular
government grants or projects at issue have “been the subject of considerable media attention”).
To qualify as a public controversy, the law requires only that the issue be discussed publicly, and
that the resolution of the issue affect others besides the immediate participants in the debate.
Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297. Those requirements are manifestly satisfied here.
Second, Aven and Fridman argue that although they may have risen to a certain level of
prominence, their fame is confined to Russia — hence, they have not achieved “general fame or
notoriety in the community” of the United States. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. At the outset, the
“general fame or notoriety” formulation is the standard for a general public figure; a plaintiff
need not attain that level of notoriety to be a limited public figure. Id. at 351-52; Waldbaum, 627
F.2d at 1298 n.32. Moreover, while it is true that the case law requires that even a limited public
figure have achieved the “necessary degree of notoriety . . . where the defamation was
published,” the defamation in this case was published on the Internet. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at
1295 n.22 (emphasis added). The audience for the CPI article is not confined to the United
States merely because that is where the authors of the piece choose to work, and it is not
immediately apparent why the limited public figure inquiry should be so confined.
Even if the Court were to limit its review of the defendants’ prominence to the United
States, the evidence in the form of Alfa Group’s promotional materials describe Aven as “an
Aven and Fridman recently acknowledged in another defamation suit that they “are 48
well known both in Russia and abroad.” Bowman Decl., Ex. 15 at 9242 (decision of arbitration
court of the City of Moscow).
Defendants also suggest that plaintiffs are limited public figures for purposes of a 49
narrower public controversy involving the battle between BP Amoco and Tyumen for the assets
of the bankrupt Sidanco oil company. Because the Court concludes that the involvement of the
plaintiffs in the broader public controversy of corruption in the post-Soviet Russian economy
meets the requirements of the limited public figure analysis, the Court need not consider the
proposed narrower controversy.
43
internationally recognized economist and author.” Phillips Decl., Ex. 101. Aven and Fridman 48
speak to influential organizations and appear on television in the United States. Aven
accompanied the acting prime minister on a diplomatic mission to the United States, where he
attended meetings with senior Clinton administration officials and cabinet members. See supra
at 8 n.20. Fridman was invited to Washington D.C. to receive a prominent award alongside
luminaries such as a Supreme Court Justice and United States Senators. See supra at 7 n.15. An
April 2001 search confined only to certain United States news publications (including the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, TIME,
Newsweek, and Business Week) yielded more than 8,500 pages of newspaper articles that
contain the words Aven, Fridman, Alfa Bank, Alfa Eco, Alfa Group, or TNK. Id. ¶ 2. Simply
put, Aven and Fridman are players on the world stage; hence, they are limited public figures not
only in Russia, but in the United States as well.49
B. OAO Alfa Bank and ZAO Alfa Eco
The corporate plaintiffs OAO Alfa Bank and ZAO Alfa Eco are also public figures for
purposes of the defamation analysis in this case. Corporate plaintiffs are treated as public figures.

B. OAO Alfa Bank and ZAO Alfa Eco
The corporate plaintiffs OAO Alfa Bank and ZAO Alfa Eco are also public figures for
purposes of the defamation analysis in this case. Corporate plaintiffs are treated as public figures
as a matter of law in defamation actions brought against mass media defendants involving
matters of legitimate public interest. See Metastorm, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d
Plaintiff maintains that the Martin Marietta ruling is in error because it “was based 50
upon the discredited rationale for the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 29,” which the
Supreme Court later rejected in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. Pl. Mem. at 55. This argument
mischaracterizes the reasoning in Martin Marietta, which discuss both Rosenbloom and Gertz,
notes that Gertz rejected the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, and then bases the corporate
public figure doctrine expressly on the analysis in Gertz. See Martin Marietta, 417 F. Supp. at
954.
Even if the rule discussed in the text were unsound, the corporate plaintiffs would 51
nonetheless be public figures for the same reason as Aven and Fridman. Alfa Bank is the largest
bank in Russia, and both corporate plaintiffs are components of one of the most lucrative
business conglomerates in the country. The corporate plaintiffs are the subject of frequent media
coverage, and the relevant documents in this case reference the corporate plaintiffs
interchangeably with their officers (including Aven and Fridman). There is no reason to treat the
corporate plaintiffs any differently than Aven and Fridman themselves.
44
665, 669 (D.D.C. 1998); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976). As a judge of this court once explained:
It is quite clear from the Court’s opinion [in Gertz], however, that the values
considered important enough to merit accommodation with interests protected by
the first amendment are associated solely with natural persons, and that
corporations, while legal persons for some purposes, possess none of the attributes
the Court sought to protect. . . . [A] libel action brought on behalf of a
corporation does not involve ‘the essential dignity and worth of every human
being’ and, thus, is not ‘at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.’
Martin Marietta, 417 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341); see also Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f the purpose of
the public figure-private person dichotomy is to protect the privacy of individuals who do not
seek publicity or engage in activities that place them in the public eye, there seems no reason to
classify a large corporation as a private person.”). CPI is a member of the mass media, and the 50
topics discussed in the CPI article (which include the relationship between United States
politicians and Russian banks accused of engaging in corrupt activities) are a matter of legitimate
public interest. Therefore, the corporate plaintiffs in this case are public figures as well.51
45
III. Actual Malice
Because plaintiffs are public figures, they may prevail on their defamation claims only if
they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants published the challenged
statements with actual malice. Masson, 501 U.S. at 510; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
The “standard of actual malice is a daunting one.” McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, 91 F.3d
1501, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quotation and citation omitted). A publisher acts with “actual
malice” if it “either knows that what it is about to publish is false or it publishes the information
with ‘reckless disregard’ for its truth or falsity.” Id. at 1508. The test is subjective: the plaintiff
must come forward with sufficient evidence to prove “that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts” as to the truth of the publication or acted “with a high degree of awareness of . . .
its probable falsity.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); McFarlane, 91 F.3d at

1508. To have acted with actual malice, the publisher must have “come close to wilfully
      blinding itself to the falsity of its utterance.” McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1508 (quoting Tavoulareas,
      817 F.2d at 775).
      The burden of proof “imposed on public figures is significantly more onerous than the
      usual preponderance of the evidence standard.” Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 776. A public figure
      may recover “only on clear and convincing proof” that the defamatory falsehood was made with
      actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1508. The requirement of clear and
      convincing evidence “administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media
      self-censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability” for defamation claims. Gertz, 418 U.S.
      at 342. “Few public figures have been able clearly and convincingly to prove that the scurrilous
      things said about them were published by someone with ‘serious doubts as to the truth of [the]
      publication.'” McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1515 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
      46
      Unlike the public figure inquiry, the question of actual malice is ordinarily one for the
      jury to decide. See Liberty Lobby v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However,
      plaintiffs in this case do not request a jury trial. The Court, then, would be the ultimate factfinder were this case to go to trial, and hence the normal summary judgment approach is altered:
      the Court is not limited to deciding questions of law on the basis of undisputed facts, but also
      may “draw a derivative inference from undisputed subsidiary facts, even if those facts could
      support an inference to the contrary, so long as the inference does not depend upon an evaluation
      of witness credibility.” Cook v. Babbitt, 819 F. Supp. 1, 11 & n.11 (D.D.C. 1993). As in any
      defamation case involving a public figure, the question for the court at the summary judgment
      stage is whether plaintiffs have identified evidence that “could support a . . . finding, by clear and
      convincing evidence, that the defendants acted with actual malice in publishing” the CPI article.
      Liberty Lobby, 852 F.2d at 598.
      The Court notes at the outset that plaintiffs have not come forward with any direct
      evidence of actual malice. Each of the witnesses who was part of the decision-making process
      has testified that defendants believed the allegations of criminal conduct to be credible. See
      Royce Dep. at 279:5-279:11 (explaining that the “total body of information” available at the time
      led him to “believ[e] that the specific allegations indeed were credible”); Heller Dep. at 428:4-
      428:11 (“From the moment the article was reported, written and published, I’ve always been
      confident, entirely confident in the sources, that they were corroborated and independent, and in
      the truth of the reporting. That’s never been of question to me, either then or now.”); Lewis Dep.
      at 237:9-237:10 (explaining that in discussions with Royce “I do remember that he felt secure”
      about the piece); Smith Dep. at 101:7-101:18 (explaining that Royce and Heller said that they
      “were persuaded that the documents were reliable, that the allegations in them were corroborated
      47
      by one another and gave a solid basis for the story” and that “all the questions and issues I had
      raised had been resolved”). Indeed, one of the CPI employees testified that Royce was
      “emphatic” that the allegations in the KGB and FSB reports were credible. See Smith Dep. at
      101:19-102:1-12. Thus, plaintiffs are unable to point to any direct evidence that defendants in
      fact “entertained serious doubts” as to the truth of the publication or acted “with a high degree of
      awareness of . . . its probable falsity.” St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731; McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1508;
      see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) (holding that “the relevance of answers” from the
      “mouth of the defendant himself” to questions regarding his awareness of falsehood “can hardly
      be doubted”); Foretich v. American Broad. Co., 1997 WL 669644, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1997)
      (“Plaintiffs offer no direct evidence of actual malice.”).
      Proof of actual malice may take the form of circumstantial evidence. See Clyburn, 903
      F.2d at 33. However, the “standard for actual malice is not what a reasonable person or a prudent
      publisher would do.” Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25, 45 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 350
      F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To prevent the inquiry into the defendant’s subjective state of mind
      from slipping into an open-ended review of the reasonableness of the defendant’s investigation
      or his compliance with professional standards, the courts have identified only three scenarios in
      which the circumstantial evidence of subjective intent could be so powerful that it could provide
      clear and convincing proof of actual malice. These scenarios are where there is evidence that the
      story: (i) was “fabricated” or the product of defendants’ imagination; (ii) is “so inherently
      improbable that only a reckless man would have put [it] in circulation”; or (iii) is “based wholly
      on a source that the defendant had obvious reasons to doubt, such as an unverified anonymous
      telephone call.” McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1512-13 (quotation omitted); see St. Amant, 390 U.S. at
1509. 
      48
      No claim is made that defendants fabricated the assertions in the CPI article. Nor are the
      allegations of organized mob ties and drug trafficking so inherently improbable that actual malice
      can be presumed. It was widely reported during the period that organized crime had infiltrated
      the Russian marketplace; indeed, the Director of the FBI estimated in testimony before Congress
      that the Russian mafia had taken control of more than 70% of all Russian commercial enterprises
      and that most of the 2,000 banks in Russia were “controlled by organized crime.” It was thus not
      inherently improbable that Alfa Bank — the largest privately owned bank in Russia — had also
      developed a relationship with organized crime and participated in other criminal activity during
      this period.
      Russian officials have investigated similar criminal allegations on several occasions. The
      allegations of organized criminal ties and drug trafficking in the FSB report were passed on by
      Ilyukhin to law enforcement officials, who wrote back a month later that Alfa Group was “being
      investigated in connection with a number of criminal cases,” including a case in which Moscow
      customs officials found arms and ammunitions in a shipment addressed to Alfa Eco. Sullivan
      Decl., Ex. 23 (letter from Vasiliev to Ilyukhin). A corruption task force once told Yeltsin that
      Aven was abusing his government position, and Alfa has acknowledged that Russian law
      enforcement officials searched the Alfa Eco offices in 1995. See Aven Dep. Vol. IIA at 126:3-
      130:1; Phillips Decl., Ex. 173; Sullivan Decl., App. 61.
      Even as to the most fantastic of the allegations — that involving heroin transported in
      sugar bags that led to the poisoning of a Siberian town — plaintiffs’ own expert explains that he
      read a Russian wire story report of the sugar poisoning incident while with CBS in Moscow; he
      found the story “intriguing” and wanted to run it down, but never got around to doing so.
      Sanders Dep. at 145:3-146:14. Alfa Eco is one of Russia’s largest sugar dealers, and transports
      49
      sugar by rail across Russia. Fain Dep. at 128:12-132:13, 140:22-143:6, 357:20-358:6, 389:12-
      392:4. The BP Amoco report, which surfaced in the course of discovery, contains a description
      of the “sugar poisoning” incident; the CIA passed the information in the BP Amoco report on to
      the Export-Import bank, and sources have stated that the allegations in the BP Amoco report
      tracked other information in the possession of the CIA. This is not to say that the assertions in
      the CPI article are true. Indeed, there is reason to believe that at least some of them are not: for
      example, no credible reports have come to light indicating that an unusual number of citizens of
      a Siberian town ever fell ill. However, it cannot be said that the allegations were so inherently
      improbable that defendants’ decision to publish the allegations amounted to actual malice.
      Lastly, this was not a case where the defendants based their article “wholly on a source
      that the defendant had obvious reasons to doubt, such as an unverified anonymous telephone
      call.” McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1512. Defendants grounded their article on several intelligence
      sources, corroborating documents, and a wealth of reports in the United States and Russian
      media. The investigation began with a review of a Washington Post article that described the BP
      Amoco report and noted that it contained two and a half pages describing criminal allegations
      against the officers of the Tyumen oil company. The CIA believed the report serious enough to
      pass it on to the Export-Import bank and give the bank a briefing on the report, and the National
      Security Council believed the report serious enough to recommend to the State Department that it
      block the loan (which the State Department did). The Washington Post article quoted an
      unnamed CIA source as stating that the report “tracked other information the agency had
      gathered.”
      Royce also reviewed a series of Russian newspaper articles describing reports that
      Fridman and Aven had organized crime and drug trafficking ties. Royce then contacted a CIA
      Plaintiffs’ expert describes Palmer as an “extremely good source.” Kaplan Rep. at 83. 52
      Plaintiffs contend that defendants cannot rely on Royce’s description of what the 53
      Russian-American specialist told him, because defendants refused to provide his identity. Pl.
      50
      source who refused to provide the BP Amoco report but confirmed that the information in the BP
      Amoco report in fact did track the CIA’s own intelligence. Royce talked to Richard Palmer, a
      second source in the intelligence community who had extensive experience in the Russian
      business world. Palmer provided Royce with an unabridged version of one of the Russian 52
      newspaper articles, which reported that Victor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the Security Committee of
      the Russian Duma, had passed on to Russian law enforcement agencies a dossier containing
      allegations of criminal activity by Fridman and Aven in 1997. The article provided a detailed
      discussion of the allegations in the dossier, including a description of alleged organized crime
      ties and drug trafficking.
      Royce then turned to a third source, a Russian-American specialist on business practices
      in the former-Soviet Union with several contacts inside Russia’s law enforcement and
      intelligence communities. The specialist told Royce that “no major oil company [in Russia] is
      free of criminal activity” and that he had “little doubt that [Tyumen] committed crimes in
      numerous occasions.” The specialist also told Royce that the specialist “himself knew” that
      plaintiffs had a “close relationship” with one of the leading organized crime groups in Russia.
      The specialist gave Royce an abridged copy of the FSB report that Ilyukhin passed on to Russian
      law enforcement agencies, which matched the allegations discussed in the Russian newspaper
      article. The specialist explained that he had contacted a source in the FSB, and that the source
      had said that the law enforcement agency would be investigating the allegations, but that the
      inquiry had been “put away for a better day.” The specialist included a fax cover sheet on the 53
      Mem. at 8 n.10. The Court has some doubt as to plaintiffs’ position. The proper course for the
      plaintiffs if they wanted the identity of defendants’ confidential source would have been to file a
      motion to compel his identity. See Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2005)
      (considering motion to compel the identity of a confidential source in a defamation case). Were
      the Court to grant the motion, both parties would then have been able to use the RussianAmerican specialist’s knowledge to their respective advantage. The Court does not see the
      wisdom in allowing plaintiffs to lie in the weeds until a motion for summary judgment is filed,
      and then spring the issue at summary judgment, denying defendants any right to use the evidence
      at all. See, e.g., Clyburn, 903 F.2d at 34 (noting in defamation case that “[w]e recognize that
      where the primary source of evidence is the reporter’s own (naturally self-interested) testimony of
      what a confidential source told him, the combination of the burden of proof and the reporter’s
      privilege to withhold the source’s identity confront a defamation plaintiff with unusual
      difficulties,” but allowing defendant to rely on source where plaintiff did not appeal district
      court’s denial of motion to compel the source’s identity). The Court notes that no hearsay issues
      are raised in this case by reliance on the confidential source’s information, because the RussianAmerican specialist’s statements are being offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to
      demonstrate defendants’ state of mind and knowledge (i.e., actual malice) when they published
      the CPI articles.
      51
      report with a comment as a postscript stating “Please don’t take this article as the gospel,” a
      statement Royce testified he took to mean that he should not “assume that every bit of
      information is accurate,” and that “[a]s in anything that comes out of Russia, be a little careful.”
      Royce Dep. at 192:4-192:9
      Royce returned to Richard Palmer, looking for information that would corroborate the
      FSB report. Palmer searched in his files and found the KGB major report, which contained
      information that a former KGB major had conveyed to Palmer in 1995. The information
      included detailed allegations of criminal activities by Fridman and Aven that paralleled the
      allegations in the FSB report. Palmer vouched for the credibility of the KGB major, and noted
      that while Palmer himself could not confirm the allegations of drug trafficking, other information
      that the KGB major had provided was correct, including a great deal of information that was not
      public knowledge at the time. Royce pressed for more information about the KGB major, but
      Palmer refused to provide any more information or to allow Royce to talk with him.
      See Harte-Hanks Commc’n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 695 (1989) (“Under 54
      our precedents, I find significant the fact that the article in this case accurately portrayed
      Thompson’s allegations as allegations, and also printed Connaughton’s partial denial of their truth
      . . . . These differences in presentation are relevant to the question whether the publisher acted in
      reckless disregard of the truth: presenting the content of Thompson’s allegations as though they
      were established fact would have shown markedly less regard of their possible falsity.”)
      52
      At that point, Royce possessed two reports corroborating criminal wrongdoing written
      two years apart and attributed apparently to different individuals. Royce knew that one of his
      intelligence sources vouched for the credibility of the individual who gave him the information,
      and that one of his other sources had confirmed personal knowledge of plaintiffs’ close ties to
      organized crime. Royce knew that more than one CIA source, including one of his own, had
      confirmed that the CIA possessed intelligence that tracked the still-unseen allegations in the BP
      Amoco report, and that other United States officials found the allegations serious enough to
      block the Export-Import loan to Tyumen. He knew that several Russian newspaper articles had
      also reported on allegations of defendants’ criminal world contacts and drug trafficking. Finally,
      the allegations were consistent with the widespread understanding, confirmed by one of his
      sources, that the Russian economy and the business dealings of the oligarchs were overrun with
      corruption and ties to organized crime.
      Royce contacted several different Tyumen executives and representatives for comment,
      and the piece was fact-checked and edited consistent with the normal CPI procedures. As
      published, the article included firm denials of the allegations of criminal wrongdoing from
      Tyumen executives and representatives, and a reference to the denials at the very outset of the
      piece. The article contained an objective description of the sources and background of the
      reports. Finally, the piece attributed the allegations of criminal conduct to the FSB and KGB
      major reports, and referred to the allegations as just that — allegations rather than fact. The 54
      (Blackmun, J., concurring); Church of Scientology, Int’l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 175 (2d Cir.
      2001) (“In view of the extensive research Behar conducted, and the fact that the death threat was
      accurately reported as an allegation, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could
      find that Behar had published the statements about the stock scam or the murder-suicide
      allegation with purposeful avoidance of the truth.”).
      53
      investigation of the piece was not perfect, and as indicated, several of the allegations in the final
      product may very well be inaccurate. But the Court cannot conclude on this record that the
      defendants published the article with actual malice or a reckless disregard towards its accuracy.
      Plaintiffs complain that defendants failed to track down certain leads — for instance,
      failing to pursue the line of inquiry the Russian-American recommended in the fax cover sheet of
      determining the status of Ilyukhin’s request that Russian law enforcement authorities investigate
      the allegations of the FSB report, or failing to contact George Soros to attempt to obtain a copy
      of the BP Amoco report that Soros might have possessed. This line of argument focuses
      improperly on what more a reasonable reporter might have done in the circumstances, not on the
      defendants’ state of mind. The “cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether
      a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
      There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
      serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731; see also Herbert v.
      Lando, 781 F. 2d 298, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We reiterate, however, that a finding of actual
      malice cannot be predicated merely on a charge that a reasonable publisher would have further
      investigated before publishing.”). A plaintiff will always be able to point to ways in which the
      defendant could have pursued another lead, or sought another piece of corroborating evidence.
      Had the defendants obtained the BP Amoco story, they would have found that it 55
      contained allegations consistent with those in the FSB Report and the KGB major report.
      Sullivan Decl., Ex. 68.
      54
      Here, the failure to pursue this additional information does not evince a willful blindness to
      competing evidence, but only a desire to put a close to the investigation of a story.55
      Plaintiffs argue that defendants could have attempted to track down the origins of the
      information that the FSB officers provided in the FSB report or the KGB major provided to
      Palmer. Pl. Mem. at 27-32, 35-38. But there is “no authority for the proposition that anything
      short of interviewing those with first-hand knowledge amounts to ‘willful blindness.'”
      McFarlane, 91 F.2d at 1510; see also Clyburn v. News World Commc’n, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 635,
      641-42 (D.D.C. 1989) (“[D]efendants’ reliance on the confidential sources, who, in turn, relied on
      informants, does not indicate actual malice.”), aff’d, 903 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Defendants in
      this case obtained corroboration for the FSB report in the form of the KGB major report, and
      Palmer vouched for the credibility of the KGB major. The failure to investigate exactly who
      provided the information to the FSB officials or the KGB major is not evidence of actual malice.
      See Clyburn, 705 F. Supp. at 641-42 (“Even if the sources did not know the identities of the
      informants in the witness summaries, and the reporters were aware of that fact, the credibility of
      the information provided in the summaries would be bolstered by the sources’ inherent reliability
      and experience as law enforcement officials.”).
      In fact, the D.C. Circuit has rejected the proposition that a publisher has a duty to
      corroborate even when a single source “of potentially libelous material is a person of
      questionable credibility.” McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1508. The court explained that to “hold that a
      publisher who relies upon a questionable source must . . . establish through an independent
      55
      source that the allegations are true” would “turn the inquiry away from the publisher’s state of
      mind and to inquire instead whether the publisher satisfied an objective standard of care.” Id. at
1510. Here, as indicated, the defendants relied on a host of corroborating evidence in publishing
      the piece. The fact that they could have researched even further does not itself supply evidence
      of actual malice.
      Next, plaintiffs maintain that defendants should have known from the anti-Semitic and
      anti-free market language in the FSB report that the document was designed to appeal to the
      prejudices of Ilyukhin, a “communist and virulent anti-semite,” and therefore was not credible.
      Pl. Mem. at 39. But there is no evidence that defendants knew Ilyukhin to be a reputed antisemite. Royce Dep. at 309:12-311:9. Royce did know that he had communist leanings, Royce
      Dep. at 306:7-307:8, but the presence of communist rhetoric in the FSB report does not mean
      that the allegations in the FSB piece are not credible. Defendants would have done well to
      present these facts to the reader to allow them to reach their own judgment. However, it is farfetched to infer from plaintiffs’ failure to do so an effort to shade the truth, particularly since
      defendants included other caveats in the piece, such as that the KGB major was working for
      banks (which would presumably be defendants’ rivals) and was from the “ideological
      counterintelligence branch.”
      Plaintiffs take issue with defendants’ failure to contact Aven and Fridman prior to
      publication of the piece, noting that defendants might have discovered information from them
      that would have cast doubt on the reliability of the FSB and KGB major reports. Pl. Mem. at 23-
1511. Plaintiffs maintain that it is a clear ethical violation to fail to call the subject of a piece (at
      least when the piece advances charges as serious as narcotics trafficking). Kaplan Report at 23;
      Heller Dep. at 221:8-221:15. Royce explains that he failed to contact Aven and Fridman because
      Shortly after the CPI article was published, the New York Times conducted an
      56
      interview with Fridman in which a reporter discussed the allegations of drug running and
      criminal ties. The reporter explains that when he “asked Fridman about it, he shrugged and said,
      ‘That stuff’s always around.'” John Lloyd, “The Autumn of the Oligarchs,” The New York Times,
      Oct. 8, 2000. Likewise, when the Moscow Times sought Aven’s reaction to the CPI article, he
      issued only blanket denials. Sullivan Decl., Ex. 100 (August 3, 2000 Moscow Times article).
      There is little reason to believe that defendants would have elicited any more specific response
      than what Aven and Fridman provided in these other settings. See McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1509
      (“Nor is it clear . . . that the individuals whom the defendant failed to contact would have
      provided any credible information. . . . Schaap could reasonably expect McFarlane to deny any
      involvement regardless of the facts.”).
      56
      he thought that he might need a translator, and that time was running short to publish the article.
      Royce Dep. at 238:17-238:22, 241:5-241:16. This explanation is less than compelling, and
      might not excuse defendants’ failure to contact Aven and Fridman as a matter of ethics. But it
      does not amount to actual malice. See McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1509 (“Schaap’s failure to contact
      McFarlane himself about the allegations provides even less support for a finding of actual
      malice.”); Secord, 747 F. Supp at 789 (“plaintiff cannot rely on the defendant’s failure to consult
      with him prior to the publication . . . as evidence of actual malice”). An inference of actual
      malice would be particularly inappropriate in this case given that defendants contacted several of
      the plaintiffs’ executives and representatives, and included each of their comments in the article.56
      Finally, plaintiffs charge defendants with several other alleged ethical and professional
      lapses involved in the research and publication of the piece. For instance, they complain that the
      article falsely suggests that two representatives of plaintiffs were contacted before the article was
      published when in fact only a single representative was contacted; that Royce violated an alleged
      pledge to Palmer not to use his information in the piece; that the article attributes a comment to
      the FSB report that is not in the report; and that Royce failed to take adequate notes of his
      discussions. The Court does not condone any ethical or professional breaches that might have
      Plaintiffs argue that an adverse inference should be drawn from defendants’ failure to 57
      produce a draft of the article that Peter Smith marked up in fact-checking the piece. Pl. Mem. at
      44-45. Plaintiffs do not explain precisely the issue on which they want an adverse inference, or
      the information they hoped would be revealed through production of Smith’s mark-ups. The
      “party seeking an adverse inference must adduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
      trier of fact could infer that “the destroyed [or unavailable] evidence would have been of the
      nature alleged by the party affected by its destruction.” Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge
      Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs have not done so here. A party cannot
      survive summary judgment simply on the basis that the opposing party has not retained every
      piece of evidence of even passing relevance to the case.
      57
      occurred. However, none of them can fairly be said to bear on the defendants’ subjective
      knowledge of the falsity of the criminal allegations in the article. That test examines the
      publisher’s subjective state of mind, and does not turn on what more, or different, a good
      publisher could have done. Hence, the standard of actual malice “is not satisfied even by proof
      of ‘highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
      investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.'” Clyburn, 903 F.2d
      at 33 (quoting Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 666).57
      It follows, then, that plaintiffs cannot survive summary judgment on the shoulders of their
      journalism expert’s opinion that defendants “violated journalism ethics” and the article does not
      “hold[] up to normal standards of investigative reporting.” Kaplan Rep. at 7, 14. Courts and
      commentators generally have not permitted plaintiffs to prove actual malice through expert
      testimony. See Lohrenz, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (“courts have generally disfavored expert
      testimony in determining actual malice, which is essentially a determination of defendants’
      subjective state of mind”); Harris v. Quadracci, 856 F. Supp. 513, 518-19 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
      (“expert opinion testimony generally is not helpful when determining actual malice against a
      subjective standard”); Sack on Defamation § 5.5.2.4 (3d ed. 2004) (“Inasmuch as the ‘actual
      58
      malice’ test is entirely subjective, the use of journalism experts in ‘actual malice’ cases is often
      puzzling . . . [and] [f]or a variety of good reasons, the courts have been reluctant to allow it.”).
      The Court cannot say that the views of an expert in the field could never be helpful in
      illuminating the options available to a publisher in investigating a piece — an essential element of
      an inquiry into whether a defendant was wilfully blind is some understanding as to what he
      should be looking for. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667 (“[A] plaintiff is entitled to prove the
      defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence . . . and it cannot be said that evidence
      concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.”). But reliance
      on expert opinion as to the defendant’s departure from journalistic ethics and the “standards of
      investigation” is unhelpful here in light of the settled law closing the door on such evidence for
      the actual malice inquiry. Clyburn, 903 F.2d at 33 (quoting Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 666).
      For all of these reasons, the Court concludes as a matter of law that defendants did not
      publish the CPI article with actual malice. This is not to say that defendants or the article are
      without fault. Defendants likely should have researched certain points more carefully before
      leveling allegations as serious as drug trafficking and organized crime connections against
      plaintiffs. The fact that certain of defendants’ sources had no information to provide should have
      given defendants pause. They might have painted a fuller portrait of the backdrop to the
      allegations for the reader (on issues such as compromat and Ilyukhin’s tendencies). As for the
      defendants’ suggestion, which surfaces in several of the depositions in this case, that further
      research was not pursued because of time pressures and a desire to beat their competitors to a
      breaking story, that is no excuse for less than thorough reporting. Nonetheless, these lapses in
      ethics and judgment amount at most to negligence or bad journalism, not actual malice.
      Because the Court concludes that summary judgment should be granted against the 58
      plaintiffs as a matter of law, the Court need not reach defendants’ contention that the complaint
      should be dismissed as to Alfa Eco because it is not the real party in interest in the action. See
      Def. Mem. at 54-58.
      59
      The entire truth regarding the allegations of criminal conduct in the FSB and KGB major
      reports might never be known, but there is cause to believe that at least some of the allegations in
      the reports are exaggerated or inaccurate. However, serving as the target of criticism —
      sometimes false — is the burden that our system of laws quite consciously places on the shoulders
      of public figures. As the Supreme Court explained in a case decided not long after it crafted the
      actual malice standard in New York Times v. Sullivan:
      It may be said that [the actual malice] test puts a premium on ignorance,
      encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be
      determined by the defendant’s testimony that he published the statement in good
      faith and unaware of its probable falsity. . . . New York Times and succeeding
      cases have emphasized that the stake of the people in public business and the
      conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the
      standard of ordinary care would protect against selfcensorship and thus adequately
      implement First Amendment policies. . . . [T]o insure the ascertainment and
      publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First
      Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.

St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 371. Plaintiffs no doubt have the wherewithal to respond to erroneous
publications through persuasion rather than litigation. The First Amendment demands that they
pursue that path.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and
judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants. A separate order will be issued. 58
/s/ John D. Bates
JOHN D. BATES
United States District Judge
Date: September 27, 2005
60
Copies to:
Daniel Joseph
Jonathan S. Spaeth
Tobias Eli Zimmerman
AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD, L.L.P.
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036-1511
Email: jspaeth@akingump.com
Peter John Loughlin
HUNTON & WILLIAMS
1900 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Email: ploughlin@hunton.com
Elizabeth C. Koch
Michael Dennis Sullivan
Chad R. Bowman
LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ, LLP
1050 17th Street, NW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20036
Email: msullivan@lsklaw.co

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